As in the maiorias of the traditional cognitivos studies, Juslin and Vstfjll they are centered in explaining the mechanisms of induction of the emotion in a perspective strong centered in neural mechanisms, considering only one part of the body: the brain that it has regions activated for external stimulatons. However, to consider the neurobiolgicos aspects of the induction of the musical emotion in them seems an important task for the agreement of the musical cognition, as well as its unfoldings for the study of the musical significao. To dedicate itself to this task, we believe that the fenomenologia of Merleau-Ponty points clearly the ways that we can tread, and agreeing to its arguments, the proposals on emotion and conscience of Damsio present a significant contribution will redirect the studies on mechanisms of induction of emotion for one perspective that does not incur into the typical problems of dualistas or psicologistas proposals (considering the areas of psychology that little become related it the neurocincia or to biology). Damsio, when considering the perception and the conscience makes, it of a very similar form to the pontyana fenomenologia: Everything what it occurs in its mind if of the one in a time and a space relative to instant in the time where its body if finds and to the region of the busy space for it. The things are inside or are of you. The ones that if finds outside are stops or in movement. The ones that is stops can be close, far or to an intermediate distance. The things that are in movement can be if approaching or if moving away, or if dislocating in a trajectory that does not pass for you, but its body is always the reference. (&) The condition of the agent requires, obviously, a body acting in the time and the space, and it has not felt without this requirement.